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MICHELMAN AS DOCTRINALIST
Gregory S. Alexander*
Frank Michelman, the theorist, is a figure known to judges and legal scholars
literally around the world. Michelman' s wildly successfully 1967 HarvardLaw Review
article, Property, Utility, and Fairness, invented the economic model of takings that
is now the starting point for every economic analysis of the takings issue.' The same
article is simultaneously the origin of a mode of analyzing takings disputes based
upon a Rawlsian theory of fairness.2 I can think of no other legal topic in which
virtually the entire theoretical landscape was not simply described, but created by, a
single piece of scholarship.
Michelman's subsequent writings on takings, such as, to pick only three examples,
the magnificent 1987 Iowa Law Review article, Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea of Property;3 his keynote article in the 1988 Columbia Law Review
symposium;4 and his 1993 William & Mary Law Review comment on Lucas,5 are simi-
lar examples of high legal theory at its very best. To put it as directly as I can, no one
does theory better than Frank Michelman.
But I want to praise a different Michelman as well: Michelman the doctrinalist.
With Michelman's dominance as a theorist of takings law as dominant as it is, it is easy
to overlook or underplay his contribution to takings law strictly at the level of doc-
trinal and case analysis. At this level as well, Michelman has no rival.
Let's go back to the Property, Utility, and Fairness article. In this sprawling, com-
plex, magisterial work (I sometimes think of it as takings law's counterpart to Mahler' s
Symphony of a Thousand), Michelman's powers as a doctrinal analyst are in full dis-
play. Two contributions are especially notable. The first is his account and critique of
* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am grateful to Professor Eric
Kades for inviting me to the conference honoring Frank Michelman, whose work has inspired
me for many years and whose friendship I treasure.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman,
Ethical Foundations].
2 Id. at 1219-24.
3 Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Prop-
erty, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1319 (1987).
4 Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987,88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988) [hereinafter Michel-
man, Takings].
5 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas
and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1993) (discussing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
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the permanent physical occupation test, commonly associated with the 1982 Loretto6
decision.7 Michelman anticipated not only Loretto's categorical approach but facts
similar to Loretto itself.8 He pointed out that "courts, while they sometimes do hold
nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny compensation for a physical take-
over."9 He went on to say that
[t]he one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropria-
tion) seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that
its agents, or the public at large, "regularly" use, or "permanently" occupy,
space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under private own-
ership. This may be true although the invasion is practically trifling from
the owner's point of view. 0
Michelman identified the two flaws with this rule of decision that are well-known
today: the fortuitousness of the permanent physical occupation factor and its ele-
vation of purely nominal harms to the level of a constitutional violation. " Both of
these factors figured prominently in the withering criticisms that commentators leveled
at Loretto.' 2 In rejecting Justice Marshall's seeming elevation of form over substance,
these critics were only restating points that Michelman had already made abun-
dantly clear.' 3
The second doctrinal contribution of that article that I want to single out here co-
ncerns another familiarjudicial test, the Hadacheck14 doctrine. As we all know, that
doctrine provides that government actions that prevent or abate public harms are non-
compensable, even when that action inflicts very substantial losses on private owners.'
The problem in this test is now familiar to all takings mavens: a government land-
use restriction that is sustained on the ground that it prevents a public harm can just
as easily be characterized as one that extracts a benefit for the public, an action that
6 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
7 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1184-90, 1226-29.
' Compare id. at 1185 (discussing installation of subterranean utility lines), with Loretto,
458 U.S. at 422 (finding the installation of television cables on the roof and side of a building
constituted a taking).
9 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1184.
'0 Id. at 1184-85.
" Id. at 1226-27.
2 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensationfor Takings: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 613-14 (1984); John J. Constonis, Presumptive and
Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 505-09
(1983); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Property Rights in the Balance-The Burger Court and Con-
stitutional Property, 43 MD. L. REv. 518, 566-68 (1984).
13 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1185.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
'5 Id. at 410-11.
[Vol. 15:371
MICHELMAN AS DOCTRINALIST
presumably requires compensation. Whether the government is more aptly charac-
terized as harm-preventing than benefit-conferring requires a neutral benchmark.
Is a regulation forbidding roadside billboards, Michelman asked, one that prevents
the harms of roadside blight and distraction or one that secures the public benefits of
safety and amenity? 6 As Michelman put it, this test "will not work unless we can es-
tablish a benchmark of 'neutral' conduct which enables us to say where refusal to
confer benefits... slips over into readiness to inflict harms."'1 Joe Sax had recog-
nized the problem and recast it in terms of his "enterprise/arbitration" approach. 8
Michelman showed that this approach is subject to the same basic challenge:
why should it be thought less odious for society to force a landowner to
contribute without compensation to the welfare of his neighbors (those
who suffer from his nuisance-like activities) than to the welfare of all of us
(who suffer from his refusal to dedicate his land to public uses)? 9
But Michelman did not throw the baby out with the bath. He recognized that
there is a stubborn intuitive appeal to the distinction, and he dug deeper, much deeper
than anyone else had or has since, to see if the harm-prevention/benefit-conferring
distinction, which so many courts seemed to find sensible, indeed does usefully serve
some other analytical purpose. 20 His answer, of course, was yes:21 "The true office
of the harm-prevention/benefit-extraction dichotomy is... to help us decide whether
a potential occasion of compensation exists at all. '22 The distinction does not help
us decide what efficiency and fairness require by way of compensation, but it does
help us recognize situations that do not raise any compensation issue at all because
the social action in question is one that merely corrects some prior theft-like redis-
tribution or deliberate redistributive gamble, rather than collectively pursuing an
efficient use of resources. 23 The intuitive appeal of the distinction, Michelman saw,
was that activities restricted by harm-preventing measures are usually of the theft
or gamble-like variety, which are a matter of corrective justice or other non-efficiency
reason; whereas activities restricted by public-benefit-conferring measures typically
are efficiency-based, raising the compensation question.24
Now, characteristically, Michelman took pains to caution against drawing any sharp
distinction between these two types of measures.2' You should not always assume that
16 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1197.
17 Id.
" Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-64 (1964).
'9 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1201.
20 Id. at 1235.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1239.
23 Id.
24 See id.
25 Id. at 1236-37.
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no legitimate compensation issue is raised by a regulation that is ostensibly nuisance-
abating or that a legitimate compensation question is always posed by a measure
that seems to be a restriction on innocent activity for efficiency's sake.26 The distinctive
should not be determinative, but it should be considered in deciding whether there
is a compensation question at all.27 Once again, Michelman's strong instinct for stan-
dards and against categorical rules is in full view. Once again, Michelman rigorously
explains how a conventional takings doctrine, properly understood, operates in a rational
and fair way.28
Fast-forward to 1988. Michelman's lead contribution to the Columbia symposium,
The Jurisprudence of Takings, dissected four major and well-known Supreme Court
takings cases from the 1986-87 Term.29 His aim, as he put it, was to "give a cogent
account of the[] decisions," rather than to "grandly theorize either them or the constitu-
tional texts they construe."3 Specifically, he set out to see if the cases fit within an
existing pattern of regulatory takings cases and to explain that pattern.3
The result was illuminating, to say the least. The pattern that Michelman saw was
a reaction against the failure, over sixty-five years, for the Court's informal open-
ended balancing approach to consistently yield victories for the claimant.32 The Court
was, as he put it, "moving noticeably towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings
doctrine."33 But it was not some crude version of legal formality that Michelman
saw.34 What he saw in the four cases was a much subtler and more limited variety
of formalism.35 He gave Nollan,36 for example, a narrow reading that, as he put it,
"fully explain[ed] the opinion and its result without, implausibly, turning Nollan into
Lochner redivivus."37 It has since become clear that Nollan, even extended by its sub-
sequent partner, Dolan,3" was mostly certainly not "Lochner redivivus." What nettled
the Court in both cases was the coerced sacrifice of the owner's right to exclude the
public, a fact that, as Michelman pointed out with respect to Nollan, put the cases in
the vicinity of Loretto, with its per se takings rule.39 Michelman's rendering of the
26 Id. at 1237-38.
217 Id. at 1238-39.
28 See id. at 1241.
29 See Michelman, Takings, supra note 4.
30 Id. at 1601.
31 id.
32 Id. at 1621-22. During this period, only two cases were decided in favor of claimants.
Id. at 1621 n.105.
33 Id. at 1622.
3 See id.
35 Id.
36 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
37 Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1609 (contrasting Nollan with Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
38 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
39 Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1608.
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limited impact of Nollan seems to have been confirmed in subsequent decisional law,
even taking Dolan into account.
Similarly, Michelman read First English4° in a way that made the regulation's in-
definite duration, the key to the case.4' He rejected a broader reading (like Justice
Stevens did) that would have made the case a broad endorsement of the principle of
"conceptual severance by time shares." '42 Here again, subsequent developments have
borne out the perspicacity of Michelman' s narrow reading, for it squares nicely with
Justice Stevens's analysis in Tahoe-Sierra.43 In fact, at the end of his discussion of First
English, Michelman posed a hypothetical that nearly matched the facts of Tahoe-Sierra
itself, for a time-limited building moratorium." As Michelman correctly predicted,
the Court there "regard[ed] [the] case as presenting a new and unresolved question."45
I could go on with many more examples of Michelman's prescient and illuminat-
ing readings of cases and rules of decision in takings jurisprudence, but time is limited
and I think my point is apparent by now. Let me close with a radical thought: rereading
Michelman's analyses of takings doctrine in these and other articles made me think that
there is a lot more coherence in takings law than conventional wisdom acknowledges.
Those who repeat the conventional wisdom that there is no logic or order in takings
need to spend some more time reading Michelman, the master doctrinalist.
0 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
4" Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1616-17.
42 Id. at 1617-19.
4' Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
44 Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1621.
41 Id.; accord Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 320-21.
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